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On 19 June 2010 the Chinese authorities announced that the renminbi (RMB) was henceforth 
to be pegged to a currency basket. Yet, it has quite closely followed the USD, though having 
appreciated by 2.7 % by the time of writing. At the G20 Seoul Summit on 11-12 November 
2010, China committed to further reform the RMB exchange rate regime. We discuss here 
what a genuine basket peg could mean for China, with the view that the weight for the EUR 
should obviously be significantly increased, the SDR being a strong option for practical 
implementation. This would also have a positive impact on the EU. China’s currency reform 
has possible implications for its USD-dominated assets. Their reduction could trigger a 
further depreciation of the USD. The potentially costly consequences call for new rules for 
the world financial architecture. China’s expansion will inevitably lead to a diminishing 
international role for the USD. 
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1. Introduction 
On 19 June 2010 the Chinese authorities announced that the renminbi (RMB) was henceforth 
to be pegged to a basket of currencies. Since then, after an initial 0.4 % appreciation against 
the USD, over 2½ months there was little change compared to the policy of pegging to the 
US dollar (USD) pursued since July 2008: the RMB was quite closely following the USD. 
By the time this paper was written (16 November), amid pressure from the US and other 
countries since early September until the eve of the G20 Summit in Seoul on 11-12 
November, the RMB was 2.7 % stronger against the USD than before 19 June. The G20 
Summit produced general guidelines for managing exchange rates and called on the IMF to 
deepen its work in this area. At the meeting, China reiterated its earlier statement that it ‘will 
further reform the RMB exchange rate regime, increase exchange rate flexibility, and 
promote a balanced BOP (balance of payments) account’ (G20 Seoul Summit 2010). After 
the meeting, on Monday and Tuesday 15-16 November, the RMB was depreciated  by 
0.1+0.2 % against the USD — perhaps symbolically to show firmness on the Chinese side.  
For a system of pegging a currency to a basket we have three analytically distinct questions: 
(1) the composition of the basket, (2) for the observers, monitoring the external value of any 
currency using a basket of currencies as the reference, and (3) management of the currency 
against its basket by the central bank. The purpose of this paper is to discuss (1) and (2), 
while all three are politically interlinked. For point (3), we discuss how the composition of 
the basket might affect the management of the RMB and some of the consequences of 
possibly changing it and making it transparent. However, we do not deal here with the 
question of the alleged undervaluation of the RMB and how to bring about its real 
appreciation through a combination of changing the nominal exchange rate of the RMB and 
any other policies affecting the relative price and cost level of China compared to the outside 
world. This latter issue is a broad topic that merits further study.  
So, we ask the questions what the RMB basket now seems to be and what it could be. These 
are open issues, obviously also for the Chinese authorities when considering the further 
reform of the RMB exchange rate regime they have committed to. The aim here is to discuss 
the facts, prospects and possible consequences of moving to a genuine basket peg where the 
EUR would have a significant weight. 
China’s diverse economic relations speak in favour of moving in that direction. Also, the role 
of the RMB internationally would be enhanced if its close peg to the USD were terminated. 
A relevant option is to peg it to the SDR (Special Drawing Right) and make this fully 
transparent. This would enhance the role of both the SDR and the RMB in international trade 
and finance. 
If the PBoC were to give a significant weight to the EUR in the RMB basket, the exchange 
rate uncertainly in EU-China trade would be reduced. Also, making the link between the 
RMB and the USD weaker would reduce the risk of disproportionate appreciation of the 
EUR if the USD were to fall.  
Moving towards pegging the RMB to a more diverse basket than hitherto, for example to the 
SDR, can be advocated on relatively solid grounds based on China’s trade flows and other 
economic ties. However, managing the change is not a simple matter as China needs to 
reform its currency policy while giving careful consideration to possible implications for its 
holdings of foreign assets. It is estimated that USD 1.6 trillion, or two thirds of its foreign 
exchange reserves of USD 2.65 trillion in September 2010, are denominated in USD. 
Reduction of the USD weight in the RMB basket could induce a shift of international asset 
holdings from the USD to other currencies. This could trigger a depreciation of the USD   3
against the EUR (and other major currencies). The consequences could be costly for the 
Chinese central bank, but also for the international economy as a whole. This calls for 
attention when designing rules for the world financial architecture. 
China’s economic expansion will in the long term lead to a diminishing role for the USD 
and, provided that China liberalises its capital movements, to an increasing role for the RMB. 
Making the basket peg of the RMB fully transparent and giving the second most important 
convertible currency, the EUR, a significant weight could be an important step in this 
direction.  
 
2. The announcement of 19 June 2010: RMB made more flexible and pegged to a basket  
The Chinese authorities announced on Saturday 19 June 2010 that the exchange rate regime 
of the renminbi (RMB) was reformed to enhance flexibility and that the reference for 
managed floating was a basket of currencies. The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) did not, 
however, give any indication of the composition of the basket or of the rules other than 
referring vaguely to ‘market demand and supply’. It was also announced that daily changes 
in the RMB/USD rate continued to be limited to a maximum of 0.5 %. 
Since then, after an initial 0.4 % appreciation against the USD, over 2½ months there was 
little change compared to the policy of pegging to the US dollar (USD) pursued since July 
2008 (Figure 1). On 1 September the RMB was just 0.2 % stronger against the USD than on 
18 June. Amid renewed pressure from the US, it appreciated by 1½ % in the run-up to a 
meeting between President Barack Obama and Premier Wen Jiabao on 23 September.  
Starting from 22 September the USD fell sharply against other major currencies amid the 
announcement by the US Federal Reserve that it would continue to ensure that the markets 
remained liquid. During the Chinese holidays of 1-7 October international pressure built up. 
When the PBoC returned to work on Friday 8 October, it fixed the USD rate at only 0.2 % 
lower than a week earlier, while the USD had fallen significantly against the EUR. At the 
IMF annual meeting on 8-10 October significant disagreements and frustration were 
expressed, resulting in stalemate (Financial Times 11 October 2010). The RMB first 
appreciated a little, followed by a 0.7 % reversal. Again, a week before the G20 Seoul 
Summit of 11-12 November the RMB started to appreciate, making it 3 % stronger against 
the USD than on 18 June. After the meeting, on Monday and Tuesday 15-16 November, the 
RMB depreciated by 0.1+0.2 % against the USD — perhaps symbolically to show firmness 
on the Chinese side. Strictly speaking, the first small change cannot be explained by 
movements in the other currencies, while the latter one could also have followed from the 
fall of the EUR (see the last two observations in Figure 1). So, this is a typical question of 
interpretation as the rule and policy followed by the PBoC is not fully transparent. 
Above, we mostly referred to the USD rate of the RMB as this is how most policy makers 
and commentators in the daily press discuss the RMB, often even forgetting to mention that 
the reference is the USD. Relatively little attention is paid to the fact that the RMB is now 
(16 November) 7 % weaker against the EUR than on 18 June, having bottomed out at a 12 % 
low when the EUR was strongest on 5 November. So, have we forgotten that the RMB is 
now supposed to be pegged to a basket?  
Figure 1 gives the RMB values of the USD, EUR, JPY, GBP and SDR since 18 June. We 
can see that the RMB has followed the USD quite closely, except initially after 19 June and 
gradually since 1 September, making the RMB 2.7 % stronger than on 18 June. This can also 
be confirmed by a statistical analysis. Assuming that the four SDR currencies (USD, EUR, 
JPY, GBP) are in the basket and using the daily quotations from 18 June confirms the almost   4
exclusive dominance of the USD, while the JPY and GBP get negative weights. Leaving 
them out gives 85-95 % for the USD and 5-15 % for the EUR. The results are in this range 
from all regressions using the whole period or the more stable sub-period, and including a 
trend variable or not. If it is assumed that there was no trend until 1 September and a trend 
thereafter, the USD-EUR basket gets weights of 94 % and 6 %.
1 
 
Figure 1. Renminbi rates of various currencies since 18 June 2010  












































































































































































































































To avoid paying excessive attention to the USD rate of the RMB, we look here at the SDR 
rate as a proxy for the effective nominal exchange rate of the RMB (the latter being a 
summary measure of the RMB rate against a wide basket of currencies, see below). The 
composition of the SDR is set by the IMF, selecting a limited number of freely usable 
currencies and determining their weights according to their relative importance in the 
world’s trading and financial system. It is also referred to here as the Chinese authorities 
have announced that they would like to promote the role of the SDR internationally (Zhou, 
Xiaochuan, 2009, Governor of the PBoC).  
Immediately after 18 June and until 1 July the EUR was weaker against the USD than 
initially (see Figure 1). This meant that the RMB became stronger not only against the USD 
                                                            
1  Including the South Korean Won and Malaysian Ringgit in the analysis does not improve the explanation. 
This was verified as the KRW was mentioned in the context of the RMB basket in 2005-2008, and on 30 
August the MYR appeared in the exchange rate table, in addition to the SDR currencies, on the website of the 
SAFE, the Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange.   5
but also against the EUR and the SDR. From 2 July the EUR appreciated, peaking on 9 
August, and rallied again from 10 September onwards. After having reached a depreciation 
of 5 % against the SDR on 5 November, the RMB is now (16 November) 2.5 % weaker 
against the SDR than on 18 June. This derives mostly from the stronger EUR, but also from 
the appreciation of the JPY and the GBP against the USD.  
 
3. Movements since July 2005 
The official exchange rate system of the RMB was unified from the beginning of 1994. From 
mid-1995 the RMB was pegged to the USD at 8.3 RMB until 22 July 2005, when it was 
appreciated by 2 % and it was announced that it would be pegged to a basket of currencies 
with some flexibility. Neither the composition of the basket nor other details were revealed.  
 
Figure 2. Renminbi rates of various currencies from January 2005 
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Source: http://www.x‐rates.com/. 





By July 2008 the RMB had appreciated against the USD by 21.1 % compared to July 2005. It 
had at the same time depreciated against the EUR by 8.3 %, driven by the appreciation of the 
EUR against the USD since March 2006; see Figure 2. For some observers these movements 
gave rise to the view that the EUR had gained a significant weight in the RMB basket 
(Frankel, 2009). However, the short-term movements in the RMB/USD rate show much less 
volatility than the RMB/EUR rate. Therefore, the alternative interpretation is that the USD   6
still by far dominated the RMB basket, but the RMB was gradually strengthened against it 
for reasons other than movements in the EUR/USD rate. The hypothesis of a crawling peg 
appreciation is also consistent with the various announcements of the PBoC (July 2005 and 
May 2007) that it would give more significance to market forces, which, at the time, drove 
the RMB upwards. 
In July 2008 (amid the global financial crisis, but before the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy) 
the PBoC announced that the previous policy was ‘temporarily’ abandoned. Since then, until 
19 June 2010 the RMB was de facto pegged to the USD with a narrow band around RMB 
6.83.  
From July 2005 to June 2010 the RMB fluctuated against the EUR, following the RMB/USD 
and EUR/USD rates. By coincidence, in June 2010, compared to July 2005, the RMB had 
appreciated 16-17 % against both the USD and the EUR, and as the values of the JPY and 
GBP had moved in opposite directions, the RMB was also 16 % stronger against the SDR; 
see Figure 2. 
Now, the depreciation of the RMB against the SDR by 2.5 % from 18 June 2010 is worth 
putting into the perspective of the earlier movements: the RMB rate of the SDR is now 
roughly back to its level at the end of 2008 (Figure 2). 
In Figure 2 we also show the movements of the RMB nominal effective exchange rate 
(NEER) from January 1994.
2 As can be seen it moves almost perfectly with the SDR rate, 
the largest deviation in spring 2009 being only 3 percentage points (obviously connected to 
exchange rate movements amid the global crisis). The RMB/SDR rate thus represents the 
external value of the RMB in a much larger perspective than just against the four SDR 
currencies, but has the important advantage that its daily observations are easily available 
and that the SDR (basket) can be freely traded at any moment in the international market.  
 
4. There are no easy options for the RMB   
It seems that the 19 June announcement has so far not led to a significant change in the 
currency basket used for daily management of the RMB. Yet, the announcement helped to 
hold back criticism of China’s currency policy by the US and others for 2½ months, and 
since September China has been able to counteract the pressure with a gradual, slightly 
fluctuating appreciation against the USD that now amounts to 2.7 %.     
One option is a continuation of this pattern: keeping focus on the RMB/USD rate and China 
making limited concessions to international pressure. However, the work on the further 
reform of the RMB exchange rate regime that China committed to at the G20 in Seoul could 
benefit from considering other options, including awareness of the problems involved in 
them.  
A genuinely freely floating RMB is not yet feasible. The RMB is not a fully convertible 
currency and capital movements in and out of China are not free. Developing conditions for 
a genuinely freely floating RMB will take at least 10 years. Therefore, we should expect that 
                                                            
2  The NEER indicators are calculated using weights from a matrix of trade flows. The European Commission 
(DG ECFIN) data are based on 41 countries (European Commission, 2010). We also checked the RMB NEER 
estimates from the BIS and IMF based on trade across a larger number of countries. All the three NEER 
indicators give the same picture and the RMB/SDR rate correlates almost perfectly with them since 1998. The 
calculations are available from the author on request.   7
the RMB will for the time being remain pegged to something under the code word ‘managed 
floating’. 
Continuation of the pace of gradual appreciation against the USD, as has now been observed 
since 19 June, would make 6-7 % in 12 months, i.e. roughly the pace from July 2007 to July 
2008. Many actors and commentators may see this as the most likely scenario, possibly as 
the second (or third) best under a limited choice. Also, Yi Gang, one of the Vice-Governors 
of the PBoC and head of the SAFE, was indeed reported to have confirmed at the IMF 
meeting that gradual appreciation continues, albeit without going into specifics (China Daily 
9 October 2010). China Daily reported on 30 October 2010 that Li Daokui, a PBoC adviser, 
had said that ‘the yuan could move 3 to 5 percent a year’, referring to the RMB/USD rate.
3 
However, gradual appreciation against the USD (or any known basket for that matter) is 
problematic and may indeed turn out infeasible. Relatively firmly held expectations of 
appreciation induce speculative inflows of hot money. This happened under the crawling peg 
in the period July 2005–July 2008, as widely recognised already at the time and firmly 
established in retrospect. Tsuyuguchi (2009), using all available statistics, estimates that the 
accumulated amount of hot money flowing in from 2007 until the first half of 2008 was close 
to USD 200 bn, and this then flowed out in the second half of 2008 when the RMB/USD 
exchange rate was fixed again. He concludes that these movements can be explained by the 
possibility of various arbitrage transactions under the expectations of appreciation of the 
RMB. Based on his figures and the change in the RMB/USD rate it can be roughly estimated 
that speculators gained USD 10-15 bn at the expense of the PBoC. This is not a small 
amount, even for the PBoC. 
Now that various measures towards liberalising capital movements have been taken and 
speculators can borrow at exceptionally low USD rates we should expect that the 
responsiveness of hot money flows has increased. It is therefore possible that disturbance 
from inflows of hot money, including gains to speculators, could cause serious policy 
problems. Geoff Dyer reports from Beijing that this is already happening and Yao Yang (a 
Chinese academic) also points to the possible grave disturbances from ‘footloose money’ 
triggered by RMB appreciation (both in Financial Times 10 November 2010).
4 
Appreciation expectations could turn out to be harmful for further reforms of China’s 
financial system if the authorities have to fight back hot money by introducing controls on 
capital movements or delaying liberalisation. Geoff Dyer reports that the regulator is already 
stepping up inspections.  
One interpretation of the policy followed from late June until early September is that the 
PBoC deliberately wanted to burn the fingers of speculators and made changes in the 
RMB/USD rate in both directions. However, the initial appreciation after 19 June and the 
trend since early September are interpreted by market commentators as indications of a trend 
                                                            
3 Focusing on the RMB/USD rate appears also in other reporting in China Daily, for example on the previous 
day (29 October 2010), as the main headline was ‘Yuan drop will help exporters’, referring to the ½ % 
depreciation against the USD over the previous two weeks, with no reference to movements of other 
currencies. We should note here that speaking about gradual appreciation can also refer to the real effective 
exchange rate in the medium term. This is a separate matter, and could indeed be targeted under many 
different strategies for the daily management of the nominal RMB rate. 
4  Gradual appreciation would help contain inflationary pressures by hitting profits and other incomes, but 
depending on whether the impact of inflowing capital is successfully sterilised it may fit badly with the 
overheated property markets.   8
that is likely to continue. This is also indicated by the RMB forward rates quoted 
internationally as the 3-month forward rate jumped to 5-6 % p.a. in October. Under such 
expectations the speculators cannot count on relatively safe profits from one day to the next, 
but if the trend towards appreciation is firm enough, say over three to six months, the result 
is almost the same as from a declared crawling peg, although with more uncertainty. 
Interestingly, the expectations indicated by the RMB forward rates tamed down after the G20 
Summit. 
While these comments should show that crawling peg is not an easy option, it is not easy 
either to regain control over the markets through a significant revaluation as a discrete move. 
If it is too small, it triggers expectations of a further move, with the same consequences as 
gradual appreciation. To kill these expectations the revaluation may have to be large, larger 
than reasonable from the point of view of economic fundamentals. As in any country, 
considering this strategy triggers infighting between the export sector and others. Premier 
Wen went as far as saying that hitting the Chinese export industries could cause social unrest 
that would be a disaster for the world (Financial Times 7 October 2010). The Chinese export 
industries have obviously got the ear of the authorities, and it seems that the gains for 
exporters due to the depreciation against the other major currencies since 19 June have not 
received due attention as the RMB/USD rate is overly accentuated. 
 
5. Hypotheses of motivations behind the 19 June announcement  
According to one hypothesis the 19 June announcement aimed at enabling a depreciation of 
the RMB against the USD if the EUR was to depreciate significantly. According to this view, 
the Chinese authorities were preparing to defend their case by explaining (to the US 
authorities and others) that the RMB should not fully follow an appreciating USD but give 
significant weight to the EUR. This view was also advanced — according to Reuters on 7 
September 2010 — by two Chinese economists, Li Jianwei and Yu Bin at a think tank under 
the State Council. They wrote, before the 19 June announcement, referring to the need to 
keep Chinese exports competitive in all markets: ‘If there is large-scale euro depreciation 
against the dollar, we should progressively increase the flexibility of the renminbi’s 
exchange rate and maintain the renminbi’s nominal effective exchange rate at a reasonable, 
balanced level’. It is plausible that this consideration affected the 19 June announcement. 
The EUR had depreciated against the USD by 13 % in less than three months, obviously 
partly due to the outbreak of the euro-area government debt crisis (Greece and others). The 
Chinese authorities had reason to be worried about its consequences. 
So far this eventuality has not emerged. After 19 June the EUR fell only a little and for a 
short period against the USD and gained strength again, being on 16 November 2010 11 % 
stronger than on 18 June. We can see that the EUR has not been given a significant weight, 
at least until now. Sure, the Chinese experts stated that flexibility should be increased 
‘progressively’. Now, the question remains as to which factors should determine this. 
Regardless of what the Chinese authorities might have in mind, we may note that if the 
weights were to be changed as a function of movements in the exchange rates, i.e. a larger 
weight for the EUR is activated only if/when it falls significantly, the policy would be biased 
towards keeping the RMB weak, following the USD when it falls and the EUR when it 
depreciates. 
Let’s be clear that this hypothesis is not confirmed, and in any case, the authorities have 
declared that further reforms are being considered. However, it gives rise to two 
clarifications: (1) if the weights in the basket are changed as a function of the movements   9
between the foreign currencies, then the basket is not well defined; (2) it is useful to call a 
policy rule genuine pegging to a basket only if the composition of the basket is well defined 
and made public — of course, also in this case the value of the currency against its basket 
could be changed by a discrete decision, but then it would be clear that it was a change in the 
peg and the economic reasons for doing so would be debated.  
The apparent non-transparency (or secrecy) of the composition of the RMB basket has 
important consequences for economic agents. Consider a counterfactual: suppose that the 
RMB had appreciated more than it did from 21 September until after the IMF meeting of 8-
10 October and again at the beginning of November before the G20 Summit. As at the same 
time the USD depreciated so strongly against all major currencies, we would not know 
whether the PBoC had increased the weight of the EUR in their basket, or whether they gave 
in to international pressure and appreciated deliberately against the USD, still pegging 
mainly to the USD. The answer to this question would have affected significantly the 
expectations on future movements and perceived risks, and via them the capital flows and 
also real economy variables.  
This was an illustration with a counterfactual, but the situation is pretty much the same with 
the current uncertainty regarding the true underlying policy rule followed by the PBoC. For 
the moment the most plausible hypothesis is that the USD by far dominates the basket and on 
these two occasions China gave in a little to international pressure. Removing this 
uncertainty by announcing the composition of the basket could be in the interest of several 
actors in this play, including the PBoC. If this were done, the outcome would most likely be 
a decreased weight for the USD as the share of the USD even in the foreign exchange 
reserves of the PBoC is smaller than the 85-95 % implied by the observed currency 
movements. 
Thus, removing the obviously excessive attention to the RMB/USD rate and continuing to 
peg to a basket but reconsidering its composition, notably increasing the weight of the EUR 
significantly, and making the basket fully transparent is an option for the PBoC that we 
consider next.  
 
6. Pegging the RMB to a transparent basket, possibly to the SDR 
The economic reasons for China to peg mainly to the USD are becoming less and less 
convincing. China itself is currently the second largest economy in terms of GDP, and it will 
even overtake the euro area in 2012 (in PPP terms). In 2008 China’s direct merchandise 
exports to the US accounted for 22 % of China’s exports, while the share of the European 
Union was 25 %. For China’s imports the share of the US is even smaller.  
Pegging the RMB to a transparent basket with a significant weight for the EUR has several 
merits. If the RMB followed a known basket of freely convertible currencies, its use in trade 
in East Asia would be enhanced. This is a stated ambition of the Chinese authorities and 
various moves have been taken in recent months. In August McDonald’s became the first 
non-Chinese company to raise funds in RMB.   
RMB-denominated private sector cross-border operations are still tiny and will remain so 
until a major move is announced and convincingly followed. If the RMB were still following 
closely the USD, there is no reason why private agents should shift to the RMB. The RMB 
becomes more attractive if it follows a broader basket of currencies and if the composition is 
made transparent. Transparency is also a signal of commitment as the consistency of the 
policy can be monitored on a daily basis. Pegging to a transparent basket separates the 
effects of relative movements in the basket currencies from the value of the RMB against this   10
basket. The latter is the key policy instrument controlled by the PBoC. The overall 
uncertainty faced by traders and asset managers is reduced if the uncertainty regarding the 
composition of the basket is eliminated.  
The exact composition of the basket is probably not decisive. It could at the extreme be the 
USD and EUR with equal weights if simplicity is desired. However, the SDR is a serious 
option as it is defined by the international community (IMF) and its composition is at least as 
defendable as that of any other basket of convertible currencies based on their global role.   
Giving prominence to the SDR would also enhance its role internationally, something that 
was advocated by PBoC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan (2009). Apart from proposals to the 
international community to this end, linking the RMB to the SDR is a decision that China 
could take on her own. As a consequence, both the SDR and the RMB would gain 
importance in international trade and finance.
5 
It is sometimes said that the SDR is not really a currency but only an artificial unit of 
account. True, it is not a currency, sui generis, but it is a well-defined basket of four freely 
convertible currencies and can therefore be traded at every moment on the international 
financial markets. Like any other well-defined basket of convertible currencies, it can 
therefore be used in commercial contracts for setting the price or amount of credit, and then 
it is for the contracting parties to cope with the risk relating to the value of the SDR in their 
home currencies. In this respect, it is not worse than the USD except for traders who regard 
the USD as their home currency. The same applies to transaction costs: as the USD is the 
vehicle currency in international transactions (and will remain so for the time being), using 
the USD is economical for the party with the USD as its home currency. Again, for all other 
traders, the SDR is as good as the USD in this regard. 
If one large country, China, were to peg its currency to the SDR, then the SDR would 
become an attractive reference unit for a large number of traders. It could become a 
commonly used invoicing currency, the price being quoted in SDR and the contract 
stipulating that the payment is made in any other currency at the prevailing exchange rate.
6  
This way the choice of the contract/invoicing currency in especially East Asian trade could 
be affected by the announced exchange rate policy rule of the PBoC.
7 
7. A European perspective  
                                                            
5 On the prospects for the SDR rivalling the USD, see Williamson (2009). Former IMF Managing Director 
Michel Camdessus launched on 17 November 2009 (Camdessus, 2009) the idea that the RMB (and the 
currencies of some other large countries) should be included in the SDR basket. This proposal was also 
endorsed by Robert Mundell in a recent press interview (China Daily 3 September 2010, report ‘Stable 
renminbi will help internationalisation moves’). This proposal may stem from considerations of prestige but 
overlooks the disadvantage that including any non-convertible currency in its basket would make the SDR 
itself non-convertible and therefore significantly hamper its use in any transactions and contracts. 
  
6  The composition of the SDR is determined by the IMF every five years. The details in force as from 1 January 
2011 will be decided at the end of 2010. The 5-yearly review of the composition does not hamper its private 
use as the new amounts of each currency are adjusted so that the value of the SDR does not change in the very 
instance of the re-definition. Also, the new composition will be valid until the end of 2015. 
7 The current rule that the daily movements in the RMB/USD rate are limited to 0.5 % would have to be 
removed under pegging to the SDR (or if the EUR otherwise had a significant weight) as traders could 
otherwise take advantage of the hangover left for further adjustment. Since 19 June 2010 the daily movements 
in the SDR/USD rate have exceeded 0.5 % on four regular banking days and twice after a holiday break.   11
A significant weight for the EUR in the RMB basket would reduce uncertainty faced by 
traders in China-EU trade. More generally, van den Noord (2009) concludes from his 
theoretical analysis of the US, China and the EU that, in the run-up to the current financial 
crisis, China’s peg to the USD aggravated the effects of liquidity glut originating from the 
US. He then concludes that, in principle, a floating RMB would be the first best for China 
and the EU as it would allow each of them to pursue their own growth and inflation 
objectives without having to absorb spillovers from the US. As a freely floating RMB is not 
feasible for many years (since China cannot fully liberalise its capital flows at once), the best 
option for both China and the EU is for China to peg to a composite of the USD and EUR.  
Similarly, Pisani-Ferry (2010), discussing positive-sum game opportunities for China and the 
EU, considers that ‘the persistence of a fixed link between the RMB and the dollar leads the 
euro and other European currencies to play the role of an adjustment variable, which 
involves a risk of disproportionate appreciation’ of the EUR.  
In short, for China, quasi-pegging to the USD means that it tends to import the monetary 
policy of the US, while pegging to a broader basket would mean that, under a fixed peg, the 
combined average monetary policy effect of all the central banks in the basket is followed. 
This is just to refer to the general tendency. In China this link is not firm, because capital 
movements in and out are not free. Also, changing the value of the RMB against the basket is 
a policy instrument controlled by the PBoC, to be used for achieving domestic 
macroeconomic objectives.  
Thus, there would be broader benefits for China and also for the EU if the PBoC were to give 
a significant weight to the EUR in the basket, in addition to reducing the exchange rate 
uncertainly in EU-China trade.   
 
8. A genuine basket separates exchange rate policy from management of FX reserves 
The primary function of the central banks is to set monetary policy in the light of 
macroeconomic factors. However, the PBoC performs an additional important function as it 
holds more financial assets than any other single public finance institution in world history, 
as Wikipedia puts it. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which is part of 
the PBoC, manages the foreign exchange reserves (Hu Yu-Wei, 2010). The two functions 
can be separated from each other, and this is most probably advisable for efficient 
management. If the exchange rate of the RMB is set against a well-defined basket, this can 
be done in a relatively simple way: use this official basket of currencies as the unit of 
account for assessing the SAFE’s performance as the asset manager.  
This rule would have important consequences for the SAFE’s portfolio: if its assets have the 
same currency composition as the basket for the RMB peg then the effect of fluctuations in 
the cross rates between the foreign currencies on the SAFE’s investment result are 
eliminated. Thus, this composition of the portfolio and its implied rate of return (over each 
period) can be regarded as the benchmark. The same argument would apply to other possible 
Chinese institutions managing foreign assets (China Investment Corporation and others).  
 
9. Possible consequences for capital flows and the EUR/USD rate 
Thus, pegging the RMB to a transparent basket, for example to the SDR, could mean a shift 
of Chinese exchange reserves towards the EUR (this could follow, in general, from delinking 
the RMB from the USD as also Pisani-Ferry, 2010, infers). This tendency follows from the 
structural factors, and leads to a separate and important question as to how the adjustment   12
could and should take place as China’s large USD holdings are there and the new stable 
structure cannot be achieved in an instant.  
In the recent past, it was estimated that two thirds of China’s foreign exchange reserves are 
invested in USD-denominated assets. This was confirmed in the news on 3 September 2010 
by China Securities Journal. Citing an unnamed reserve manager it stated that the shares 
were: USD 65 %, EUR 26 %, GBP 5 % and JPY 3 %. Based on this, USD 1.6 trillion out of 
China’s total foreign exchange reserves of USD 2.5 trillion (in June 2010; the latter being 
roughly 50 % of Chinese GDP) is invested in USD-denominated assets, most of them issued 
by the US Treasury and US government agencies (mortgage-linked bonds).  
With this initial currency composition, pegging the RMB to the SDR could induce a 
significant reduction in the share of USD-denominated assets in Chinese foreign exchange 
reserves. Out of the USD 1.6 trillion denominated in USD, a shift down to the weight of the 
USD in the SDR could lead to a reduction by a few hundred billion USD.  
Such a shift, possibly accompanied by a shift in holdings by other agents, could have serious 
consequences, triggering a significant depreciation of the USD against other major 
currencies, notably the EUR and JPY (as also pointed out by Pisani-Ferry, 2010). China, 
triggering this move, would directly suffer from the fall in the value of its USD asset 
holdings. European producers would suffer from decreased cost competitiveness in 
international markets. Japan is already struggling with an overvalued JPY. The US economy 
could also suffer, directly from an inflationary impulse and indirectly via negative 
developments in the rest of the world. Other factors affecting the major currencies would not 
necessarily eliminate this scenario (the fall of the USD after 21 September 2010 is the most 
recent warning sign). The EUR is currently strong despite the economic crisis in the euro 
area. In the medium term the US may face even bigger challenges with its government 
deficit and debt. 
As the short-term consequences can be serious, the PBoC will certainly manage the shift of 
its USD holdings to other currencies carefully. The value of the USD investments has been 
one of the main concerns of the Chinese authorities already for years, as repeatedly 
expressed, for example, by Premier Wen Jiabao. It is conceivable that re-pegging to the USD 
in July 2008 was driven by this concern, and the Chinese authorities wanted to signal their 
trust in the USD in order to stabilise it. It was probably not a pure coincidence that the USD 
then started to appreciate (against the EUR), and this continued until November 2008, i.e. 
also after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008. International financing was 
disturbed badly, but the USD appreciated by 24 % against the EUR from July to November. 
The Chinese treated the USD as the safest currency, and others followed. 
The Chinese authorities still occasionally reiterate the trust they then showed in the USD, 
and it is conceivable that giving dominance to the USD in the RMB basket still today is 
affected by their concern for the value of the USD.  
It is understandable that China as one of the main players dislikes instability. This may mean 
that it moves very cautiously and gradually. It is the largest single holder of foreign exchange 
(USD 2.65 tn), by far larger than the Eurosystem (EUR 250 bn) and the US Federal Reserve 
(practically none as it issues the USD). Due to the huge amount of its USD assets, the PBoC 
does not want to withdraw them in a way that would cause a fall in their value. It also gave 
supporting signals to the EUR in late spring 2010 when the EUR was under pressure, partly 
due to the interest in preserving the competitiveness of Chinese production in European 
markets. Some market commentators consider that the steep rise of the JPY since last April, 
especially after the PBoC’s 19 June announcement, was partly caused by acquisitions by   13
China (Bloomberg 9 September 2010). According to these sources the Japanese authorities 
were seeking contact with their Chinese counterparts. Whatever else might have happened, 
the Japanese central bank intervened in mid-September and succeeded in bringing the JPY 
down, although this turned out to be only a temporary success.  
 
10. Managing the transition 
The question then arises as to what could be done to achieve the long-term economic benefits 
and to avoid an excessive fall in the value of the USD during the transition.  
There are not many effective ways to cope with this. It is not easy to find another party who 
would be willing to accommodate a several hundred billion USD shift in currency holdings 
and eliminate the unwanted disturbance to the exchange rates. The various central banks 
could aim at this, as they have occasionally done in the past since the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system. However, the potential shift in currency holdings is larger than ever. The 
capacity of the central banks is limited by their own capital. The Eurosystem has close to 
EUR 400 bn (including unrealised capital gains; October 2010). There is always the 
imminent risk that supporting the USD could eventually fail and the Eurosystem would incur 
a massive financial loss. Japan is a big creditor of the US government and it will have to 
consider the various options carefully. However, increasing the share of USD-denominated 
holdings would go against Japan’s ambition to reduce it.  
This leaves us with the US institutions. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, in 
especially serious circumstances they have carried out foreign exchange market 
interventions, coordinated with other governments and central banks. The US Federal 
Reserve, with its capital estimated at somewhat over USD 400 bn (own capital plus 
difference between market and book value of gold reserves), can intervene in the market to 
support the USD and it can also sell gold. 
However, the main player in the end is the US Treasury itself with its borrowing operations. 
If a free fall of the USD threatens, it can prevent it by denominating some of its debt in EUR, 
SDR or other convertible currencies. 
This may sound unrealistic but it has happened before. In 1978 the US Treasury issued a 
series of bonds denominated in German marks and Swiss francs to prevent a fall in the USD 
(‘Carter bonds’, after the US President at the time). This precedent has been remembered now 
as new initiatives for global financing are in high demand. For example, Jaeger (2010), 
discussing the prospects for the RMB becoming a reserve currency in the next 15-20 years, 
considers that the US government ‘may increasingly have to resort to issuing non-dollar-
denominated debt’. 
This could happen as part of the process of bringing government finances more upfront in the 
new architecture for the world monetary and financial system. The euro area countries show 
the lead. They now borrow mainly in EUR, also from outside the euro area, but they have 
accepted discipline on public debt. The ceilings have surely been exceeded, but they still give 
guidance and are going to be made harder in the wake of the public finance crisis in some 
Member States.  
Maybe also the US Treasury needs to adopt self-discipline. It could have an upper ceiling for 
its debt issued in USD and denominate any temporarily needed excess in other currencies. 
Such a rule would eliminate the suspected moral hazard of defaulting on part of its debt 
through inflation and a falling dollar. This would make its policies more credible.    14
Realistically, a fundamental change like this will not emerge in the near term. However, the 
currency markets are forward-looking and it is always possible that the views of the long-
term prospects may change and affect the markets instantly. Expectations of a healthy reform, 
even if it is perceived to take time to achieve, may provide well-needed stability to the world 
financial system right now.   
The PBoC is one of the three or four biggest players in both daily management of world 
finances and in designing the system’s future architecture. In some ways it is the most 
influential one as it has the largest reserves. It naturally weighs the consequences of its 
actions carefully as it knows that it affects the markets by its volume, intentionally or not. 
China sets the value of the RMB against the other currencies according to its own rules, and 
may revise them. It would be an exaggeration to say that it also sets the bilateral rates 
between the major currencies by its asset holding policy. However, this element is there at 
every moment. It makes its moves and sees carefully how the market reacts before moving 
further. All other players in the market, including private agents, are watching China.  
 
11. Summary and conclusions  
On 19 June 2010 the Chinese authorities announced that the renminbi (RMB) would 
henceforth be pegged to a currency basket. Yet, it has quite closely followed the USD, though 
having appreciated by 2.7 % by the time of writing this paper (16 November 2010). Statistical 
analysis indicates that assuming only the USD and EUR were in the basket, the USD has a 
weight of 85-95 % and the EUR the remaining 5-15 %. This pattern and the movements 
between the major currencies over this period mean that the RMB has depreciated against 
any reasonable basket of major convertible currencies. We use the SDR as a proxy for such a 
basket as it reflects the relative importance of the four major convertible currencies for China 
and the global economy.  
 
Based on China’s diverse economic ties we considered here a genuine basket peg with a 
significant weight for the EUR, the SDR being a strong option for practical implementation. 
This would enhance the role of both the SDR and the RMB internationally, and also have a 
positive impact on the EU.  
It is obvious that fundamental changes in the international financial institutions and 
instruments will take time to emerge. Most notably, the RMB will not assume a significant 
role until it has become freely convertible. The process to achieve this will easily take at least 
10 years, perhaps significantly longer. What is certain is that it will not happen without 
transparency in managing the external value of the RMB as otherwise private agents will not 
use it widely. More transparency reduces the risks for the market participants but, at the same 
time, liberalised capital flows become more difficult to control for the Chinese authorities. 
This is a dilemma that is always facing them. The Chinese have expressed their long-term 
objective of moving in this direction as it is necessary for an enhanced role for the RMB 
globally.  
China’s move to give more prominence to the EUR could have implications for its USD-
dominated foreign exchange reserves, estimated at USD 1.6 trillion. Their reduction could 
trigger a depreciation of the USD against the EUR. Therefore, the EU economy and others 
would be adversely affected. This calls for further work on the world financial architecture. 
Putting the size and currency composition of government debt of all major countries on the 
agenda of the international financial institutions is not an easy task. However, it is obvious 
that they are among the main economic factors that have spillover effects on neighbours. In a   15
world that is moving away from the dominance of the USD in international financing and 
trade towards a tri-polar system comprising the USD, EUR and RMB, enhanced international 
collaboration is indispensable for keeping volatility of currencies within tolerable limits.  
Some of the issues involved may not sound very relevant for the most immediate future, at 
least for those who believe that the RMB is misaligned and all efforts should be made to 
convince the Chinese authorities to appreciate it significantly. Distancing ourselves from this 
controversy, as real  appreciation in the medium term is a much broader issue, we have 
discussed here the regime of pegging the RMB to a basket determining its value from one day 
to the next. At the G20 Seoul Summit of 11-12 November 2010, China committed to ‘further 
reform the RMB exchange rate regime’. In considering the options, they face several 
questions, some of which seem merely technical, such as the composition of the RMB basket, 
but may still potentially have significant implications for both China and the rest of the global 
economy. Due to its economic size and share in world trade, and its international asset 
holdings, China’s policy regarding ‘managed floating’ of the RMB is important for the global 
economy already at this stage, regardless of what the longer-term implications are. 
Policy makers always face the question whether it is better to be transparently committed to a 
policy line or to keep their hands free for interfering. Defining the basket for pegging the 
RMB fully transparently or keeping it blurred is one such question. The choice matters for 
both immediate effects and long-term prospects.   
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